A new nuclear crisis is taking shape. After the United States's strikes on Iran's underground nuclear site at Fordow, in June 2025, Britain, France, and Germany (E3), on August 28, triggered the "snapback" clause of the 2015 nuclear deal citing violations by Tehran. The world has not much time to choose between diplomacy and escalation.

If this window closes without agreement, the United Nations will restore earlier measures that call for a halt to enrichment, tighten controls on arms transfers, restrict finance and shipping, and re-designate individuals linked to Iran's nuclear and missile programmes.

The stakes are global. Iran rejects the move as unlawful. Washington sees it as a test of non-proliferation. Europe views multilateral commitments on trial. Russia and China seek delay and leverage. Israel and the Gulf states weigh warning times and war risks. Oil importers watch prices. Shipping companies reassess insurance. Banks calculate exposure. For India, the anxieties are sharper still. Its extended neighbourhood must remain stable, oil must keep flowing through the Strait of Hormuz, and the safety of eight million Indian citizens in West Asia must be ensured.

The vacuum of facts

These concerns are magnified by the absence of verified information. Since the strikes on Iranian facilities, no one has walked the rubble with a dosimeter or tested a coolant line. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) staff left Iran after its Parliament passed legislation halting cooperation without approval from the Supreme National Security Council. Rumour has replaced measurement. Every capital has drawn its own conclusions while global attention shifted elsewhere.

IAEA access is not a formality but the hinge of diplomacy. Verification replaces speculation with facts, sets a baseline on Iranian stockpiles, and anchors negotiations to data, not fears. Regular IAEA updates on Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, under Russian control, calmed jittery markets. A comparable presence in Iran could steady expectations and reduce volatility. If verification is framed as a sovereign choice, rather than a concession, it would strengthen Iran's claim that the programme is civilian while upholding the non-proliferation bargain.

Yet, Tehran's reservations are not unfounded. Iranian officials argue that sovereignty and security outweigh treaty obligations. They fear inspectors may, even unintentionally, enable targeting of sensitive sites. This is not paranoia. Strikes by Israel and the U.S. in the past closely followed IAEA disclosures. Such episodes have hardened parliamentary resistance. There is also the calculus of leverage. Revealing what survives of the programme could weaken Iran's hand in bargaining with Washington.

Since the E3 triggered its snapback, some Iranian legislators have urged withdrawal from the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. That would strip the IAEA of legal authority to inspect Iranian sites. The crisis would then enter uncharted territory with sanctions hardening and the military option returning to the fore.

Where India fits in

India cannot stand aside. As a long-standing member of the IAEA Board, with ties across divides, it is well placed to assist. As a part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), India, at the Tianjin summit, has joined other nations in condemning the military strikes by Israel and the U.S. against Iran.

Within the SCO and BRICS -- both of which include Iran -- India can support a diplomatic call to restore technical IAEA access in a form that protects operational details while ensuring transparency. If framed as a sovereign choice by Tehran, and backed by the Global South, it may gain Iranian approval. India can also contribute technical capacity. Its IAEA-certified Tarapur facility could handle sample analysis under safeguards, showing that responsible stakeholders can provide practical support in moments of crisis. These contributions would not make headlines, but they could shift the balance toward diplomacy at a time when the risk of escalation is high.

A closing window

The window for diplomacy is narrowing fast. By allowing IAEA inspectors into Bushehr to monitor the refuelling of the nuclear power plant last month, Iran has offered a small opening. Also, last week, on September 9, 2025, , the IAEA and Iran signed an agreement in Cairo, Egypt. If this extends to bombed sites, the E3 may respond by pausing the snapback. Such choices could shift the momentum back to diplomacy. The alternative is grim -- sanctions, standoffs, and a cycle of strike and counterstrike.

For India, the choice is clear. Backing verification protects its interests in West Asia, its citizens abroad, and its energy security. It also marks India as a responsible global power. The way forward is simple. It is time to let Geiger counters, and not guesses, decide Iran's nuclear programme.

Syed Akbaruddin was an international civil servant at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from 2006 to 2011

Let Geiger counters, not guesses, shape Iran actions